Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Categorical Imperative: Kant's theorem from § 7 (Basic Law of Pure Practical Reason) in the Critique of Practical Reason. "Act in such a way that the maxim of your will at any given time could at the same time be regarded as a principle of general legislation." (German, "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne.") The categorical imperative occurs in Kant’s work in several different formulations. See also ethics, morals, principles, laws, actions, cognitivism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stanley Cavell on Categorical Imperative - Dictionary of Arguments
II 196 Categorical imperative/CavellVsKant: the categorical imperative should be better a categorical declarative: a description of what it means to be moral. II 197 Categorical declarative: says what you actually do when you are moral. It cannot guarantee that one will not act immorally. >Principles, >Utilitarianism, >Deontology, >Norms, >Ethics, >Morals, >Actions, >Community._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Categorical Imperative
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27